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JUDICIAL MISAPPLICATION OF THE
INDIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
TO INJURIES RESULTING FROM AN
EMPLOYER'S WILFUL CONDUCT
INTRODUCTION
The close of the Industrial Revolution which engulfed this coun-
ty during the nineteenth century was marked by a significant in-
crease in the number of industrial injuries.1 Spurred by a growing
public concern for the safety and well-being of the laborer, numer-
ous state legislatures across the country responded by passing
workmen's compensation legislation.2 Typical of this humanitarian
legislation is the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act of 1929,
which was designed to relieve injured employees of the financial
burden of medical expenses and loss of wages resulting from work-
related injuries.' Prior to the passage of this Act, the Indiana
employee who was injured on the job as the result of his employer's
negligence could seek redress only from the courts, usually on the
theory of common law tort liability.4 Invariably an employee's
chances for recovery were dependent upon his ability to prove the
negligence of the employer. Even if such fault could be shown, the
employer often times avoided liability by asserting the affirmative
defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk.5 If it
was shown that the employee had to any degree assumed the risk or
contributed to the injury, the employee's cause of action failed.6
Without other recourse, the employee who had suffered a disabling
injury or incurred massive medical expenses was, along with his
family, confronted with dire economic circumstances.7
1. See generally 58 AM. JUR. Workmen's Compensation § 2 (1948); 1 A. LAR-
SON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4 (1978) [hereinafter cited as LARSON); B.
SMALL, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW OF INDIANA § 4 (1950) [hereinafter cited as
SMALL]; Kelly, Workmen's Compensation-Still a Vehicle for Social Justice, 55 MASS.
L.Q. 251 (1970).
2. See 1 LARSON. supra note 1, § 5.20 at 37.
3. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2 (1976). See SMALL, supra note 1, § 1.2 at 6.
4. See SMALL. supra note 1, § 1.2 at 6.
5. The employer had a third defense called the "fellow servant rule," which
was a form of the assumption of risk doctrine. If the employee was injured through the
act of one of his fellow workers, he could not maintain a cause of action against the
employer. In other words, being injured by a fellow employee was among the risks
assumed. The fellow servant defense is not listed in the body of this note because it
bears little consequence on injuries caused by an employee's wilful conduct. See
SMALL, supra note 1, § 1.2 at 6.
6. SMALL. supra note 1, § 1.2 at 6-7.
7. Id.
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In 1929 the Indiana Legislature recognized the inadequacy and
social injustice of the common law remedy and revoked it in favor of
statutorily guaranteed compensation under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act.' As a symbol of equity for the laborer, the Act operates
as a balance or mutual compromise between the interests of the
employer and the employee." The employee relinquishes his common
law remedy and in turn the employer gives up his common law
defenses." The employee is guaranteed reasonable compensation for
work-related injuries, while the employer is protected from
unlimited liability." Through this form of humanitarian" legislation,
the legislature has indicated its belief that the financial burden of in-
dustrial injuries should be borne by industry rather than the
employee."
Despite the humanitarian motives behind workmen's compensa-
tion, the Act and its judicial application have failed to eliminate all
of the inequities which characterized the common law approach to
liability for industrial injury. For an injury to be compensable under
the Act, it must satisfy the requirements of an "accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment." 4 In furtherance of the
legislative intent to supplant guaranteed compensation for the
uncertainty of a common law action, the judiciary has liberally con-
strued these conditions in favor of the employee and thus has, when-
ever possible, included the injury within the scope of the Act. 5 With
8. Id. See also In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N.E. 289 (1920).
9. See generally Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hightower, 107 Ind. App. 46, 22
N.E.2d 875 (1939); In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N.E. 289 (1920); 2A LARSON,
supra note 1, § 65.10 at 12-4.
10. See note 9 supra.
11. Id.
12. The courts often refer to the Workmen's Compensation Act as
"humanitarian" or "remedial" legislation. This refers to the purposes which underlie
the Act and the legislative intent to benefit the employee. Generally stated the pur-
pose of the Act is to remove the injustice of the common law remedy and the common
law protection of the employer by guaranteeing the employee reasonable compensation
for his work-related injuries. In doing so the legislature has 1) freed the courts of the
delays and costs of a regular tort action, 2) relieved the public welfare system of a
large financial drain which would result if the employee or his family was restricted to
a common law remedy, and 3) promoted the safety of the industrial setting by placing
a limited economic burden on the employer for industrial injuries.
13. See notes 6 and 8 supra and accompanying text.
14. The Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act of 1929, IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2
(1976).
15. See Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973); Sam Winer and Co. v. Spelts, - Ind.App. - , 348 N.E.2d 670 (1976); Motor
Dispatch, Inc. v. Snodgrass, 157 Ind. App. 591,301 N.E.2d 251 (1973); Goldstone v. Kozma,
149 Ind. App. 626, 274 N.E.2d 304 (1971); Fogle v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 133
Ind. App. 95, 173 N.E.2d'668 (1961).
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respect to unintentional injury, this judicial approach has helped to
effectuate the legislative purpose of removing from the employee
the economic burden of work-related injuries.8 However, liberal ap-
plication of the Act has been extended so far as to include injuries
caused by an employer's intentional or wilful conduct." As a result
the employer today enjoys a blanket protection against liability
somewhat similar to that afforded him under the common law.
Under present judicial interpretation of the Act, the employer can
freely assault his employees or intentionally disregard any danger
to them without fear of economic loss over and above his normal
workmen's compensation insurance premiums. Thus, the Indiana
Workmen's Compensation Act, which was intended to benefit the
employee, is in effect condoning those actions of the employer which
present the greatest risk of injury to the employee.
The source of the problem is twofold. First, the judiciary has
misconstrued legislative intent to substitute the Act for pre-existing
common law remedies. In addition the courts have failed to recog-
nize that including injuries wilfully caused by the employer within
the scope of the Act is highly inconsistent with the Act's purpose of
benefiting the employee. Section 22-3-2-6 of the Act, commonly re-
ferred to as the "exclusive remedy clause," expresses a legislative
intent to substitute the rights and remedies afforded by the Act for
all pre-existing common law remedies. 8 The legislature, however,
limited the scope of those rights and remedies by designating as
compensable only the injuries which result from an "accident arising
out of and in the course of the employment."" By limiting the scope
of compensability, the legislature surely did not intend to remove all
remedies from the employee whose injury is not compensable under
the Act. Presumably, only when the circumstances of the injury
satisfy the conditions of being both job-related and accidental did
the legislature intend for an employee to be precluded from a com-
mon law cause of action.
Unfortunately, Indiana courts have treated the exclusive
remedy clause as if it were unconditional and, in fact, determinative
16. See In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N.E. 289 (1920).
17. See, e.g., North v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1974);
Selby v. Sykes, 189 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1951); Burkhart v. Wells Electronics Corp., 139
Ind. App. 658, 215 N.E.2d 879 (1966); Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115 Ind. App.
426, 59 N.E.2d 364 (1945); Harshman v. Union City Body Co., 105 Ind. App. 36, 13
N.E.2d 353 (1938); Furst Kerber Cut Stone Co. v. Mayo, 82 Ind. App. 363, 144 N.E. 857
(1924).
18. See IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (1976).
19. See IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2 (1976).
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of whether the circumstances of the injury satisfy the conditions of
compensability." The employee is considered to have exchanged his
common law remedy for the benefit of having a workmen's compen-
sation system without reference to isolated injuries.2 As a result at-
tempts to maintain a common law action against the employer for
wilful conduct have been decided on the basis of a judicially created
goal of exclusivity.22 Instead of independently determining whether
wilful conduct falls within the scope of an accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment, Indiana courts have merely ac-
cepted the resulting injury as compensable, via prima facie treat-
ment of the Act as the employee's sole remedy. 3
The scope of this note is limited to examining judicial interpre-
tation of workmen's compensation law with respect to injuries sus-
tained by the employee as a result of his employer's wilful conduct.
The phrase "wilful conduct" is used to describe any conduct of the
employer which involves a general or specific intent. In particular,
this includes intentional acts such as the assault and battery of an
employee, a wilful violation of a statutory safety regulation, and
wilful and wanton misconduct; the latter generally being defined as
conduct which exhibits a reckless disregard for the safety of
others. 4 Not included within the scope of this note are forms of con-
duct such as ordinary negligence and gross negligence, since these
degrees of conduct are unintended and so more clearly fall within
the "accident" provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act.25
This note examines both past and present judicial application
of industrial law in Indiana to injuries incurred by the wilful conduct
of the employer. It will be shown that the present method by which
the courts include such injuries within the scope of the Workmen's
Compensation Act neither comports with the statutory re-
quirements of what constitutes a compensable injury nor is consis-
tent with the legislative goals which underlie the Act. The note con-
cludes with a discussion of the options available to the Indiana
courts and legislature for correcting the inequities that presently
20. See note 32 infra. and accompanying text.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Clouse v. Peden, 243 Ind. 390, 397, 186 N.E.2d 1, 4 (1962) (driving on a
gravel road at 80 miles per hour "to see how fast the car would go" and with
knowledge of approaching intersection). See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, §§ 68.30 to .35,
at 13-18 to -40, for treatment of non-physical torts committed by an employer against
an employee.
25. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 34 (4th ed. 1971).
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surround the issue of liability for injuries which stem from an
employer's wilful conduct.
JUDICIAL MISAPPLICATION OF THE ACT
AS AN EXCLUSIVE REMEDY
The "exclusive remedy" clause expresses a legislative intent
that the Workmen's Compensation Act function as the sole remedy
for all industrial injuries which satisfy the conditions of an "accident
arising out of and in the course of employment.""6 However, the
courts have applied the exclusivity of the Act as if it were itself
determinative of whether the injury meets the conditions.27 This
judicial interpretation of the Act contravenes both the historical
goals of the Act and the scope of a compensable injury as intended
by the legislature.
The Exclusive Remedy Clause
Judicial interpretation of the Workmen's Compensation Act has
resulted in a double standard depending on whether the employee
seeks workmen's compensation or a common law remedy for his in-
juries. When the employee desires compensation, the courts have
consistently enhanced his opportunity for recovery by liberally con-
struing the requisite conditions of a compensable injury." The
courts rationalize this construction as a furtherance of the humane
purposes of the Act.2 However, when the employee seeks a common
law remedy, the courts have minimized the significance of the condi-
tions in favor of an exaggerated emphasis on treatment of the Act
as an exclusive remedy.' The scope of the conditions has been con-
strued in furtherance of a judicially created degree of exclusivity
rather than the humanitarian aspects of the Act. 1 Through use of
this double standard the courts of Indiana have to date effectively
precluded the employee's common law remedy against his employer.2
26. See IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2 (1976).
27. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
28. See note 15 supra. See also Prater v. Indiana Briquetting Corp., 253 Ind.
83, 251 N.E.2d 810 (1969); Burger Chef Syss., Inc. v. Wilson, 147 Ind. App. 556, 262
N.E.2d 660 (1970); DeArmond v. Myers Gravel & Sand Corp., 142 Ind. App. 60, 231
N.E.2d 864 (1967), appeal after remand, 145 Ind. App. 351, 251 N.E.2d 51 (1969).
29. See notes 15 and 28 supra and accompanying text.
30. See note 17 supra.
31. Id.
32. Indiana courts are familiar with an employee seeking a broad interpreta-
tion of the Act in order to include his injury therein. However, "a considerable amount
of law, often bad law, has been made in damage suits in which the positions of the par-
ties are reversed, with the employee denying coverage in order to escape the exclusive
1979]
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Relevant sections of the Workmen's Compensation Act do not
clearly preclude the employee's common law remedy for all injuries.
Only when the injury is compensable under the Act has the legisla-
ture substituted statutory compensation for the common law. Sec-
tion 22-3-2-2 of the Act requires that every employer and employee
"shall be required to comply with the provisions of this law, respec-
tively to pay and accept compensation for personal injury or death
by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and
shall be bound thereby. . . ."3 In other words, the injury must
satisfy the conditions of an "accident arising out of and in the course
of the employment" in order to be compensable. Section 22-3-2-6 of
the Act, the "exclusive remedy" clause, further requires:
The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee
subject to this act on account of personal injury or death
by accident shall exclude all other rights and remedies of
such employee, his personal representatives, dependants
or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of
such injury or death.u
This section can be read and understood in two different ways,
depending on whether the legislature intended the phrase "on ac-
count of personal injury or death" to state why the employee is
"subject to this act" or when the rights and remedies are "granted
to an employee." If "on account of personal injury or death by acci-
dent" modifies "subject to this act," then the sentence in effect says
that "the rights and remedies herein granted to an employee shall
exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee." Regardless
of the cause of the injury, the Act would be the employee's only
remedy for industrial injury. However, if the legislature intended
the phrase to modify "granted" and thus restate the accident re-
quirement of a compensable injury, then the employee's "other
rights and remedies" appear to be excluded only when the employer
suffers a compensable injury.
remedy rule, and the employer with equal earnestness pleading for a broad construc-
tion of compensation coverage." 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 65.10 at 12-5. Since the
vast majority of workmen's compensation cases concern non-wilful injury, the courts
are in the habit of broadly interpreting the Act in order to include the injury. As a
result the courts seem to have equated the "inclusion" of industrial injuries with the
concepts of "humanitarian legislation" and "liberally construing the Act in favor of the
employee." However, the inclusion of an employer's wilful conduct is contrary to the
legislative intent to benefit the employee and promote safety in the industrial setting.
In effect the courts have created a legislative goal in order to maintain a consistent
judicial emphasis on the inclusion of all injuries.
33. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2 (1976).
34. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (1976).
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The second of these two alternatives is more plausible in light
of the punctuation used in the statute and general furtherance of
the goal of the Act to benefit the employee. The statute contains no
comma after "employee" which could indicate a subsequent modifier.
In addition, the purpose of benefiting the employee is furthered by
the exclusion of his common law remedy only when he is offered a
statutory compensation substitute.
In this context Sections 22-3-2-2 and 22-3-2-6 appear to allow
the employee to maintain a common law action against his employer
for wilful conduct if the employee's injury fails to satisfy the condi-
tions of an "accident arising out of and in the course of the employ-
ment." Section 22-3-2-2 requires that an injury satisfy these condi-
tions in order to be compensable. Section 22-3-2-6 provides that the
rights and remedies of the Act (compensation for an "accident aris-
ing out of and in the course of the employment") shall constitute the
employee's exclusive remedy against the employer "on account of
such injury or death." In other words the exclusive nature of the
Act as a remedy is restricted in application to those injuries for
which compensation is granted. Therefore, the key factor in deter-
mining whether the Act precludes a common law action against the
employer is the courts' interpretation of what constitutes an "acci-
dent arising out of and in the course of the employment." If the
injury does not satisfy the necessary conditions, then it is not com-
pensable and the Act should not operate to preclude a common law
remedy.
Despite the language of the Act and its apparent meaning, in
several decisions concerning an employer's wilful conduct, Indiana
courts have over-emphasized the exclusivity of the Act and disre-
garded the statutory definitional requirements of those injuries
which the Act was intended to cover." This is exemplified by the
holding in Burkhart v. Wells Electronics Corp.," where the court
denied the plaintiff-employee a common law action against her
employer for an intentional assault. In arriving at its decision, the
court failed to adequately determine whether an intentional assault
satisfied the conditions of an "accident arising out of and in the
course of the employment." The coirt totally disregarded the "acci-
dent" condition and found the "asising out of' condition to be satis-
fied without reference to either the meaning of the condition or the
35. See note 17 supra.
36. 139 Ind. App. 658, 215 N.E.2d 879 (1966). In Burkhart a male supervisory
employee of the defendant employer struck "with great force" a union stewardess as
the result of a controversy between them.
19791
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humanitarian goals of the Act. 7 When the plaintiff objected that ap-
plying the Act would shield the employer from greater civil liability,
the court strongly emphasized the exclusive nature of the Act as a
remedy in order to deny the action.-"
The Burkhart holding is typical of several Indiana decisions
which represent a judicial trend to minimize the significance and
limit the scope of the phrase "accident arising out of the employ-
ment" in deference to the "exclusive remedy" clause. 9 The Act
clearly expresses a legislative intent to apply the element of ex-
clusivity only after the conditions of a compensable injury have been
satisfied.'0 Yet the courts have applied the exclusivity independent
of the conditions as if it were the only legislative purpose behind
the enactment. Frequently cited, In re Bowers 1 exemplifies this
trend:
[I]t should be presumed from a consideration of the
general spirit of the act and the sound economic policy
upon which it is grounded that the Legislature did not in-
tend by the act to narrow the rights of an injured em-
ployee, but rather that . . . the act, while not circum-
scribed by such limits, should extend to all situations
wherein, were there no Workmen's Compensation Act, an
injured employee would have his remedy at the common
law for injuries received. ..."
The Bowers court over-emphasized the notion of exclusivity to the
point of making it nearly unconditional in the determination of
which accidents give rise to a common law remedy and which fall
within the purview of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
If the legislature had intended for such emphasis to be placed
on the Act as an exclusive remedy, it could easily have made the
theory of exclusivity applicable to all industrial injuries rather than
just to "the rights and remedies granted to an employee subject to
this act.""3 Instead the courts have in effect rewritten the Act, ignor-
ing the statutory language which makes application of the exclusive
remedy clause dependent upon satisfaction of the conditions which
37. Id. at 881.
38. I&
39. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
40. See IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (1976).
41. 65 Ind. App. 128, 116 N.E. 842 (1917).
42. Id. at 842.
43. See IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (1976).
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define a compensable injury. The legislature intended for these con-
ditions to be construed in favor of the employee in light of the pur-
pose for which the Act was passed"-not in furtherance of the Act
as an exclusive remedy. The exclusive nature of the Act should be
construed in conjunction with, yet dependent upon, satisfaction of
the conditions. This is the only manner in which the employee will
receive compensation for his work-related injuries in the manner in-
tended by the legislature.
EFFECT UPON THE CONDITIONS OF A COMPENSABLE INJURY
The exclusive nature of the Workmen's Compensation Act as a
remedy is not determinative of whether an employee's common law
action against his employer for wilful conduct is precluded by the
Act. Common law actions are abrogated by the Act only when the
employee's injury is sustained from an "accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment." However, the exaggerated em-
phasis which the courts have placed on the element of exclusivity
has affected the interpretation of these conditions. The following
section examines this judicial interpretation and how it should be
corrected in order to further the Act's purpose of eliminating the in-
equities which existed under the common law.
Intentional Conduct May Result in an Accident So Long as it is
Unexpected
Indiana courts have generally defined the term "accident" as
an "unlooked for mishap, an untoward event, which is not expected
or designed.' 5 In determining the scope of this definition, the courts
44. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
45. See Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. App. 178, 117 N.E. 555
(1917). See also the following Indiana cases, each of which uses this definition as a
beginning point for argument: Heflin v. Red Front Cash & Carry Stores, Inc., 225 Ind.
517, 75 N.E.2d 662 (1948); United States Cas. Co. v. Griffis, 186 Ind. 126, 114 N.E. 83
(1916); Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., - Ind. App. - , 366 N.E.2d 207 (1977); Inland
Steel Co. v. Almodovar, __ Ind. App. -, 361 N.E.2d 181 (1977); Estey Piano Corp.
v. Steffen, 164 Ind. App. 329, 328 N.E.2d 240 (1975); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Cumm-
ings, 160 Ind. App. 160, 310 N.E.2d 565 (1974); Wolf v. Plibrico Sales & Serv. Co., 158
Ind. App. 111, 301 N.E.2d 756, rehearing denied, 159 Ind. App. 43, 304 N.E.2d 355
(1973); Chestnut v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 145 Ind. App. 504, 251 N.E.2d 575 (1969);
Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115 Ind. App. 426, 59 N.E.2d 364 (1945); American
Maize Prod. Co. v. Nichiporchik, 108 Ind. App. 502, 29 N.E.2d 801 (1940); General Print-
ing Corp. v. Umback, 100 Ind. App. 285, 195 N.E. 281 (1921); Townsend & Freeman
Co. v. Taggart, 81 Ind. App. 610, 144 N.E. 556 (1924); Standard Cabinet Co. v. Land-
grave, 76 Ind. App. 593, 132 N.E. 661 (1921); Indian Creek Coal Co., v. Calvert, 68 Ind.
App. 474, 119 N.E. 519 (1918); Puritan Bed Springs Co. v. Wolf, 68 Ind. App. 330, 120
N.E. 417 (1918).
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have often stated that the word "accident" should be used in its
popular sense. 6 Because popular use of the term "accident" does not
contemplate events or injuries caused intentionally, logic would
mandate that a clear distinction be made in workmen's compensa-
tion decisions between conduct involving a general or specific intent
and negligent behavior. The courts, however, have included injuries
resulting from both types of conduct within the scope of the "acci-
dent" condition.47 The courts' categorization of wilful conduct as an
accident appears to be based upon a strained expansion of the
"unexpected result" theory, 8 a test originally used by the courts to
determine an employer's liability for injuries caused solely by non-
wilful or unintentional behavior.
49
In defining the word "accident" with respect to non-wilful in-
jury, most courts follow the "unexpected event" theoryM stating
that an accident is a "mishap or untoward event not expected or
designed."'" In defining what constitutes an unexpected event, the
courts have utilized two theories: the "unexpected cause" and the
"unexpected result."52 Under the "unexpected cause" theory, an
unexpected "event" or "accident" cannot occur in the absence of
some kind of increased risk such as unusual exertion or the malfunc-
tion of a machine which causes the injury.' By comparison the "un-
46. See, e.g., Stacey Bros. Gas Const. Co. v. Massey, 92 Ind. App. 348, 175
N.E. 368 (1931); Haskell & Barker Car Co. v. Brown, 67 Ind. App. 178, 117 N.E. 555
(1917).
47. See North v. United States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1974); Selby
v. Sykes, 189 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1951); Burkhart v. Wells Electronics Corp., 139 Ind.
App. 658, 215 N.E.2d 879 (1966); Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115 Ind. App. 426,
59 N.E.2d 364 (1954); Harshman v. Union City Body Co., 105 Ind. App. 36, 13 N.E.2d
353 (1938); Furst Kerber Cut Stone Co. v. Mayo, 82 Ind. App. 363, 144 N.E. 857 (1925).
48. See Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., - Ind. App. - , 366 N.E.2d 207
(1977); Indian Creek Coal Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N.E. 519 (1918).
49. Indian Creek Coal Co. v. Calvert, 68 Ind. App. 474, 119 N.E. 519 (1918).
50. See note 45 supra.
51. During the last several years in Indiana, the topic of dispute in most of
the litigated workmen's compensation cases has shifted from the accident condition
and has focused instead on whether the injury arose out of and in the course of the
employment. Although the accident requirement appears to be conceded, especially in
cases involving claims for cancer, stomach ulcer, and heart and circulatory difficulties,
the courts still require some untoward or unexpected event. See, e.g., Wolf v. Plibrico
Sales & Serv. Co., 158 Ind. App. 111, 301 N.E.2d 756 (1973), rehearing denied, 159 Ind.
App. 43, 304 N.E.2d 355 (1973). See also SMALL, supra note 1, § 5.1 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
52. Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., __ Ind. App. , 366 N.E.2d 207 (1977).
See also SMALL, supra note 1, § 5.1 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
53. See SMALL, supra note 1, § 5.1; Rivera v. Simmons Co., 164 Ind. App. 381,
329 N.E.2d 39 (1975). The unexpected cause theory has also been referred to as the "in-
creased risk doctrine." This is an area of workmen's compensation law where it is
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expected result" theory holds that an accident may occur where
everything preceding the injury was uneventful and only the injury
itself was unexpected.5 The judiciary favors the "result" definition
of an unexpected event because it expands the scope of the Act to
include non-wilful injuries that occur in the absence of an increased
risk.5 5 For example, an accident "results" when an employee is in-
jured by stooping or lifting in the course of his everyday duties
even though the causal relationship between the job and the injury
is remote." The injury is compensable because the event is unex-
pected. By widening the class of compensable injuries to include in-
juries which occur without an unexpected "cause," the "unexpected
result" theory favors the employee and furthers the humanitarian
nature of the Act. 7
A form of the "unexpected result" theory has also been utilized
by Indiana courts to include wilful injuries within the scope of the
accident condition." However, because the element of intent in wil-
ful conduct does not blend well with the notion of an "unexpected
result," the judiciary employs the theory somewhat uniquely. 9
Unlike non-wilful conduct, wilfully caused injuries usually involve
more than one person and more than one mental viewpoint. Using
these added elements, the courts have found it necessary to decide
whether the injury should be unexpected and without design from
the viewpoint of the employee, the employer, or both.
Popular use of the term "accident" suggests that an injury
should be unexpected and undesigned from the standpoint of a third
person or at least from that of both the employer and the employee."
often difficult to differentiate between the "accident" and "arising out of' conditions.
The purpose of requiring an increased risk is to cement the causal relationship be-
tween the injury and the employment. For an excellent discussion on the varying
treatment of the increased risk doctrine in Indiana courts, see SMALL, supra note 1, §
6.2 (Supp. 1976).
54. See Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc., - Ind. App. - , 366 N.E.2d 207
(1977); Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 181 (1977);
Lock-Joint Tube Co. v. Brown, 135 Ind. App. 386, 191 N.E.2d 110 (1963).
55. Ellis v. Hubbell Metals, Inc. - Ind. App. , 366 N.E.2d 207 (1977).
56. See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
57. See Motor Dispatch Inc. v. Snodgrass, 157 Ind. App. 591, 301 N.E.2d 251
(1973). See also note 55 supra and accompanying text.
58. The reader should note that there has been very little litigation in Indiana
on the question of an employer's wilful conduct. The judicial desire to include as many
industrial injuries within the scope of the Act as possible is evident in judicial treat-
ment of both types of injury.
59. See note 61 infra and accompanying text.
60. Popular use of the term "accident" with respect to wilful injuries suggests
that the injury or occurrence be unexpected and without design from anyone's point of
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However, in order to include wilful injury within the scope of the
Act, Indiana courts have stated that the term "accident" is to be
"used in its popular sense, and means any mishap or untoward
event, not expected, and not designed by the one who suffered the
injury." 1 This approach is similar to use of the "unexpected result"
theory in the non-wilful injury context in that it speaks to the result
and its unexpected nature from the standpoint of the injured
employee rather than that of the employer who causes the injury.
Although the employer reasonably expects or even intends the con-
sequences of his conduct, the employee cannot successfully claim ex-
ception to the "exclusive remedy" clause on the basis that the injury
was not caused by accident because, as with most injuries, the
employee did not expect to be injured. Such logic suggests that if
the employee did expect to be injured, the injury could not have oc-
curred by accident.
Treatment of Wilful Injuries as Unexpected Events is Not Beneficial
Overall to the Employee
At first glance, viewing a wilful injury from the standpoint of
the person who is injured appears to benefit the employee. By in-
cluding wilful injuries within the scope of the "accident" condition,
the employee is provided with a broader guarantee of compensation.
Unfortunately, guaranteed compensation is not entirely favorable to
the employee in the context of wilful injuries because it offers no
deterrence to such conduct. In fact the judiciary's exaggerated em-
phasis on inclusion of all industrial injuries within the scope of the
Act has actually placed the employee in a position which is less bene-
view. WEBSTER'S THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 11 (1961) defines accident as a) "an
event or condition occurring by chance or arising from an unknown or remote cause;"
b) "lack of intention or necessity;" c) "an unforeseen unplanned event or condition." No
matter how liberally the courts wish to construe the term "accident," the essential
elements of its meaning must remain reasonably the same or it becomes a word dif-
ferent from that used by the legislature.
61. Pearson v. Rogers Galvanizing Co., 115 Ind. App. 426, 59 N.E.2d 364
(1945); Furst Kerber Cut Stone Co. v. Mayo, 82 Ind. App. 363, 144 N.E. 857 (1924).
Viewing an injury which results from the wilful conduct of another from the stand-
point of the injured seems to have originated in England. The House of Lords
deliberated for several weeks over a case where reform school boys with brooms killed
their teacher. The House ruled the death was an accident from the teacher's point of
view and therefore compensable. Trim Joint District School v. Kelly, A.C. 667, 7
B.W.C.C. 274 (1914). However, where the assault was by the employer himself instead
of a fellow employee or a third party, the House of Lords denied compensation. Blake
v. Head, 106 L.T. 822, 5 B.W.C.C. 303 (1912). See Horovitz, Modern Trends in Work-
men's Compensation. 21 IND. L. J. 473 (1946).
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ficial to him than that which he experienced under the common
law.62
Prior to the Act, a common law remedy against the employer
for wilful conduct was the only cause of action in which the em-
ployee was likely to be successful against his employer. Under the
common law, the employee was often denied any form of compensa-
tion for his injuries because of the difficulty of avoiding the defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in a negligence ac-
tion against the employer."' However, under common law tort
theory, these defenses would have been of little use to the employer
against an action for wilful conduct such as an intentional assault or
wilful and wanton misconduct." Thus, prior to the Act, the em-
ployee's best opportunity to receive compensation for work-related
injuries lay in court with an action for an intentionally caused in-
jury.
While an action for intentional or wilful tort was the most
beneficial of remedies for the employee under common law, nearly
complete elimination of the employee's opportunity to seek a com-
mon law remedy has today become the aspect of workmen's compen-
sation law which is most detrimental to the employee." The extent
of the employee's recovery under the Act for wilful injury is limited
to the statutory amount established in the Act." As a result, there
are few economic restraints on the conduct of the employer.67 The
employer is relatively free to wilfully injure his employees without
fear of loss over and above his normal workmen's compensation in-
surance premiums. In effect the courts' exaggerated emphasis on ex-
clusivity and unique treatment of the accident condition in the wilful
injury context has afforded the employer a form of protection not
unlike that which he enjoyed under the common law where he often
escaped liability for his misconduct. Meanwhile the em-
ployee is arguably in a worse position today with respect to wilful
injury than he was under the common law."
62. See notes 30 and 31 supra and accompanying text.
63. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
64. See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 65, at 424 and § 68, at 444 (4th ed.
1971).
65. Although the employee appears to have been benefited by guaranteed
compensation under the Act, he is in fact in a worse position today than under the
common law with respect to the deterrence of an employer's wilful conduct.
66. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-6 (1976).
67. See note 117 infra.
68. Both workmen's compensation and a common law action for damages are
means of providing the employee with the necessary dollars to cover the expenses of
his injury. Workmen's compensation is guaranteed, yet minimal in amount. A common
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An approach to industrial injury which would be more equi-
table and beneficial, to the employee would involve actually utilizing
the term "accident" in its popular sense." In this manner the ele-
ments of expectation and design would need to be absent from the
standpoint of both the employer and the employee in order to
satisfy the "accident" condition."0 Non-wilful injuries would fall
within the "accident" condition because they are unexpected from
the viewpoint of both the employer and the employee. Wilful in-
juries, however, would fail to satisfy the "accident" condition
because the employer who intentionally caused the injury could not
claim it to be unexpected or without design.71 The "exclusive remedy"
clause 7 of the Act would be inapplicable and the employee would be
allowed to maintain a cause of action against the employer.
Under this approach employers who wilfully injure their em-
ployees would lose the limited liability protection of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The employee could exercise the opportunity to
gain adequate compensatory damages as well as punitive damages
for the employer's wilful behavior. This approach would be consis-
tent with the legislature's attempt to provide the employee with
adequate compensation for his injuries and, at the same time, serve
to deter the wilful conduct of the employer through the threat of
economic loss exceeding the normal workmen's compensation pay-
ments.
The Accident Must Arise Out of the Employment
In addition to being unexpected, an accident must "arise out of
and in the course of the employment in order for the injury to be
compensable.17 The "arising out of' condition requires that a causal
connection exist between the accident and the performance of an
law action offers no guarantees of recovery yet is the only means of attaining compen-
sation commensurate with all the consequences of a permanent injury (the price of an
eye, the value of one's potential earning power, etc.). A common law action can func-
tion as a deterrent through punitive damages, while workmen's compensation in effect
condones an employer's wilful conduct. The optimal choice is most likely a combination
of the two, such that if the action fails the employee can still obtain minimal compensa-
tion under the Act.
69. See note 60 supra.
70. Id.
71. See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 68 at 13-1.
72. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-2 (1976).
73. Id. This phrase has been aptly described as "deceptively simple and
litigiously prolific." Cardillo v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469, 470 (1947).
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employment task."' The companion condition, "in the course of," has
been regarded by the courts as connoting an injury which occurs
within the time period of the employment and at a place where the
employee may reasonably be while performing his duties or
something reasonably incidental thereto."5 The time and place re-
quirements of a compensable injury are the same for both wilful and
non-wilful injuries. Therefore, this section focuses primarily on the
effect which the courts' eagerness to include wilful injuries within
the Act has had upon judicial interpretation of the "arising out of'
condition.
Indiana courts have generally held the accident to arise out of
the employment when it originates from "a risk which a reasonably
prudent person might comprehend as incidental to the employment
at the time of entering into it, or, when the facts show an incidential
connection between the conditions under which the employee works
and the injury."77 As suggested by the courts' use of the phrase "in-
cidental to the employment," the "arising out of" condition con-
templates the factors of origin, source, or contribution rather than
causation in the sense of being proximate or direct." The standards
of a satisfactory connection between the accident and the risks of
the employment are far less restrictive than the limitations of the
tort law concept of proximate cause." Causation is established when
the employment is a contributing cause or source of the injury.0
Although the employment need not be a proximate cause of the
injury, it should be more than a "cause in fact" to satisfy the "aris-
ing out of" condition. A "but for" or "cause in fact" test tends to
equate the "arising out of" condition with its counterpart, "in the
74. See, e.g., Noble v. Zimmerman, 237 Ind. 556, 146 N.E.2d 828 (1957), re-
versing on transfer, _ Ind. App. -, 137 N.E.2d 233 (1956); SMALL, supra note 1, §
7.2 (1950 & Supp. 1976).
75. See, e.g., Noble v. Zimmerman, 237 Ind. 556, 559, 146 N.E.2d 828, 838
(1957).
76. The notions of time and place do not speak to the nature of the accident.
Therefore, the injury will have occurred either in or out of the course of the employ-
ment regardless of whether the act which produces the injury is wilful.
77. Lasear, Inc. v. Anderson, 99 Ind. App. 428, 434, 192 N.E. 762, 765 (1934).
See Kariger Motors, Inc. v. Kariger, 132 Ind. App. 85, 173 N.E.2d 916 (1961); Broderick
Co. v. Flemming, 116 Ind. App. 668, 65 N.E.2d 257 (1946); Hayes v. Perry, 116 Ind.
App. 590, 66 N.E.2d 73 (1946); Tom Joyce 7 Up Co. v. Layman, 112 Ind. App. 369, 44
N.E.2d 998 (1942). See also Note, Recreational Injuries and Workmen's Compensation"
Infusion of Common-Law, Agency-Tort Concepts, 34 IND. L.J. 310 (1959).
78. See Armstead v. Sommer, 126 Ind. App. 273, 131 N.E.2d 340 (1956); Olson
v. Trinity Lodge, 226 Minn. 141, 32 N.W.2d 255 (1948); 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 6 at
3-1.
79. 1 LARSON, supra note 1, § 6 at 3-1.
80. Id.
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course of." To say "but for the employment" is little different from
saying "but for the employee's presence at that time and in that
place, the injury would not have occurred." The "arising out of" con-
dition speaks to the origin of the risk to the employee as opposed to
the time and place of the accident.8
The conditions of the employment when the employee first ac-
cepts the job or under which the employee presently works com-
prise a special zone of danger peculiar to the employment.82 From
this zone the risk of a particular injury must originate in order to be
compensable. It is not a question of whether the risk or hazard is
peculiar to the employment, but whether the employment is the
predominant factor in exposing the employee to the risk in a greater
degree than if he was pursuing his own personal affairs." In other
words the zone of danger created by the hazards of the employment
is distinguishable from a zone of danger which is common to society
as a whole. If the injury originates particularly from the employ-
ment zone, then it satisfies the "arising out of' condition."
Legislative use of the phrase "arising out of" has left much
room for judicial determination of what risks originate in the
employment. Since the language of the Workmen's Compensation
Act itself offers no clue as to the scope of the "arising out of' condi-
tion, the judiciary has correctly chosen to interpret the condition in
light of the legislative intent in passing the Act. The courts have
often stated that the Act should be liberally construed in favor of
the employee in order to further the humanitarian purposes that
underlie the Workmen's Compensation Act."
The best means of determining whether the courts have indeed
furthered the goals of the Act in their treatment of wilful injuries is
to look at the results of that treatment." In Selby v. Sykes,87 an
81. Id
82. Cf. O'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951), reversing,
182 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1950); Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N.Y. 470, 128 N.E.
711 (1920).
83. See note 77 supra.
84. See Armstead v. Sommer, 126 Ind. App. 273, 131 N.E.2d 340 (1956). See
also note 77 supra.
85. See notes 15 and 28 supra and accompanying text.
86. Looking at the result involves a question of perspective. To the employee
who seeks inclusion under the Act, a judicial determination that the risk involved is
"of the employment" appears to be a furtherance of the legislative intent to benefit the
employee. To the employee who is wilfully injured by his employer and who seeks a
common law remedy, a determination that wilful conduct is an "incident of the employ-
ment" appears destructive of legislative intent.
87. 189 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1951).
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employee brought a common law action against the employer for in-
juries sustained when he fell through a weakened portion of the roof
on which he was working.8 Despite his protests the employee had
been ordered by the employer to work during high winds on the
snow-covered roof. 9 Ignoring the unusual risk forced upon the
employee, the court held that the employer's wilful and wanton
misconduct and wilful violation of a statutory duty was incidental to
and, therefore, arose out of the employment." In Burkhart v. Wells
Electronics Corp.,91 a female employee was assaulted and battered
by her employer following a work-related argument."2 The court sug-
gested that an assault and battery which resulted from personal
reasons may fall outside the scope of the "arising out of" condition.
However, due to the work-related nature of this argument, the court
found the employer's wilful conduct had originated in the employ-
ment."' In both Selby and Burkhart the courts ignored the actual
risk to the employee created by the employer's wilful conduct as
well as the nature of the employer's intent as a potential
superceding cause of the injury."'
This judicial disregard for the actual risks created by an
employer's wilful conduct is contrary to the intent of the legislature
to benefit the employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act
and to promote safety in the industrial setting. Prior to the
88. Id
89. 1& at 772.
90. 1L
91. 139 Ind. App. 658, 215 N.E.2d 879 (1966).
92. 1L
93. Id at 881.
94. AL
95. See note 17 supra and accompanying text. It is arguable that the origin of
wilful conduct lies neither in the employment situation nor is society generally, but
rather in the intent formed by the employer's reaction to those situations. It is the ele-
ment of intent or wilfulness which makes the employer's wilful conduct particularly
dangerous to the employee. The employment does contribute to an employer's wilful
conduct but not in a manner significantly different enough from society in general to
warrant judicial disregard of the employer's responsibility for his own actions. To rule
otherwise is to say that there is an element of the employment itself which primarily
leads to the wilful conduct. This shift in emphasis from the employer's intent to the
employment as the origin of a wilful act stretches the limits of a causal connection to
the breaking point. The legislative intent to benefit the employee and promote safety
in the industrial setting through the Workmen's Compensation Act is hardly furthered
by such a construction.
96. Cf. American Steel Foundries v. Fisher, 106 Ind. App. 25, 17 N.E.2d 840
(1938). See also Boek v. Wong Hing, 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1939); Readinger v.
Gottschall, 201 Pa. Super. 134, 191 A.2d 694 (1963).
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passage of the Act, there was little incentive for the employer to
provide the employee with safe working conditions."7 The common
law remedy was inadequate as a means of applying economic
leverage against the employer, and there were few available govern-
mental sanctions against unsafe employment practices." Today
under the Act, the employer must seek to prevent injury if he
wishes to reduce the amount of compensation being paid to his
employees." In addition, the legislature has established various
regulatory schemes under the Indiana Occupational Safety and
Health Act 10 which make available sanctions against the employer
who violates established safety regulations.'
Despite this trend toward greater protection and benefit for
the employee, the courts of Indiana have stretched the concept of
risks incidental to the employment to include all forms of an
employer's wilful conduct except a personally related assault and
battery."' Thus, most wilful injuries are classified as compensable
along with non-wilful injuries regardless of differences between the
two in the origin of the risk and the likelihood of danger which faces
the employee."' The employee's common law remedies are precluded
97. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. The Indiana Employer's Liability
Law of 1911, IND. CODE 22-3-9-1 (1976), provides for liability of employers of five per-
sons or more for death or injury to an employee resulting from negligence on the part
of the employer. It also contains some limitations upon the use of the contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and fellow-servant defenses. Nevertheless, the courts,
bound by precedent, continue to produce pro-employer decisions. See North v. United
States Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 810 (7th Cir. 1974); Horovitz, Modern Trends in Work-
men's Compensation, 21 IND. L.J. 473 (1946); SMALL, supra note 1, § 2.4.
99. In most situations the employer will probably be trying to keep his
workmen's compensation insurance premiums at a minimum.
100. IND. CODE §§ 22-8-1.1-1 et. seq. (Supp. 1978).
101. Both IOSHA and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 28 U.S.C. §§
651 et seq. (1976), provide penalties for unsafe industrial practices. In particular, Sec-
tion 22-8-1.1-36-1 of IOSHA provides for fines of up to $10,000 and imprisonment of up to
six months for an employer's first offense in wilfully violating any standard
or rule and thereby causing the death of an employee. However, due to the nature
of wilful conduct, the effect of such sanctions as a deterrent may be minimal.
Established safety regulations cannot account for the spontaneous and often momen-
tary aspects of wilful conduct. Nor does such sanction provide for wiful conduct which
results in injury short of death.
Placing a governmental sanction on the employer for his wilful conduct does lit-
tle to enhance the economic situation of the employee and/or his family. If the
employer is to sustain an economic loss as the result of his conduct, it seems far more
equitable and just to give the money to the employee rather than the government.
102. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 17 and 95 supra and accompanying text.
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and the employer pays the same insurance premium whether he in-
tentionally caused the injury or not. The courts are in effect saying
that neither legislative intent nor public policy warrants the deter-
rence of wilfully caused injuries. According to this rationale, the
person who accepts employment is in effect also made to accept the
risk of being wilfully injured by his employer as a natural risk of
any employment situation.
The inclusion of wilful conduct within the scope of the "arising
out of" condition neither benefits the employee nor promotes safety
in the industrial setting. By its use of the phrase "arising out of,"
the legislature allowed the judiciary the freedom to determine what
risks are incidental to the employment in light of the humanitarian
purposes which underlie the Act.'0 ' In order to construe the Act in
favor of the employee and, in light of the principles which underlie
the Act, the courts should limit the scope of the condition to those
risks which are reasonably incidental to the employment. No
reasonable man would equate wilful and non-wilful conduct in terms
of the degree of risk which faces the employee. Nor would a
reasonable man contemplate the risk of wilful injury as a natural
risk of the employment. Under this construction the employer's wilful
conduct would not arise out of the employment. The possibility
would then exist for a common law remedy against the employer
and the use of punitive damages as a deterrent.
As a result of the courts' denial of punitive damages via a com-
mon law action against the employer, there are today no effective
deterrents against the wilful conduct of an Indiana employer. The
employer can ignore the minimal cost of compensation benefits and
continue with impunity to disregard the safety of the employee.0 5 In
effect the courts have condoned actions of the employer which are
contrary to both public policy and the humanitarian ideals which
fostered the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
CORRECTION OF THE INEQUITIES CREATED BY JUDICIAL TREATMENT
OF EMPLOYERS' WILFUL CONDUCT
The Indiana Legislature intended for the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act to function as a balance between the employer and
employee in terms of the rights each surrenders under the Act.'"
104. See notes 28 through 32 supra and accompaning text.
105. See Survey- Workmen's Compensation, 8 IND. L. REV. 289, 294 n.34
(1974).
106. See generally Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hightower, 107 Ind. App.
46, 22 N.E.2d 875 (1939); In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N.E. 289 (1920); 2A LAP
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However, as a result of judicial misapplication of the principles of
the Act to wilful injuries, the balance has been tipped in favor of the
employer. In order for the Act to regain this balance as well as the
characteristics of a remedial law designed to benefit the employee,
both the legislature and the courts must recognize the inequitable
results which have developed from the failure to distinguish be-
tween wilful and non-wilful conduct under workmen's compensation
law. Several options are available to the Indiana Legislature for
righting the scales of the Workmen's Compensation Act and
recognizing this distinction.
The Workmen's Compensation Act as a Balance Between the In-
terests of the Employer and the Interests of the Employee
Although the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act was enacted
primarily for the benefit of the employee, it was also intended
to function as a balance or mutual compromise whereby both the
employee and the employer relinquish some of their rights and in
turn receive certain benefits."7 The employee is guaranteed prompt
and moderate compensation for his injuries regardless of fault and
in exchange relinquishes his rights to a common law action."8
With respect to non-wilful conduct, the balance represents a ra-
tional and economically sound program. However, inequities which
undermine the purpose and spirit of the Act occur when the
employee is injured by the wilful conduct of his employer and then
forced to accept the limited workmen's compensation benefits for
the injury. By including an employer's wilful conduct within the
scope of the Act, present Indiana case law indirectly condones the
employer's actions. In doing so, the courts have tipped the balance
which the legislature imposed on the employer and employee in
favor of the employer."° To restore the system to its intended
equitable compromise, the legislature and/or the courts must
recognize the high risk of injury which accompanies wilful conduct
and the necessity for deterring such conduct.
SON, supra, note 1, § 65.10 at 12-4; Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer
Suability: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, 8 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818 (1974).
107. See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 65.10 at 12-14.
108. Id.
109. Judicial treatment of the employer's wilful conduct has not likely induced
the employer to spend large sums of money in order to provide a reasonably safe in-
dustrial setting. Rather the courts have allowed the employer freedom to weigh the
expense of providing a reasonably safe place of employment against the relatively in-
significant increase in his workmen's compensation insurance premiums which may
result from an increase in the number of injuries among his employees.
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The Workmen's Compensation Act provides the employer with
numerous defenses based upon an employee's wilful conduct which
can be used to defeat a compensation claim, but it does not grant
similar defenses to the employee."' For example, the employee loses
his benefits if the injury is due to his wilful commission of a minor
offense or misdemeanor,' while the employer who wilfully injures
an employee is not penalized for his conduct. Instead he pays only
the usual benefits accorded the employee. Since these costs are ab-
sorbed by the employer's insurance carrier whose premiums are
paid by the consumer in the form of higher prices for services and
merchandise, the employer experiences little or no economic conse-
quence of his wilful conduct." 2
The purpose of allowing the employer to assert defenses under
the Act is to protect the employer from liability for injuries which
occur despite the reasonable measures he undertakes to promote
safety."' With the possible exception of misdemeanors, each defense
provided for in Section 22-3-2-8 of the Act includes the element of
knowledge or wilfulness."" Thus the employee conduct contemplated
110. IND. CODE § 22-3-2-8 (1976), states that:
No compensation is allowed for an injury or death due to the employee's
knowingly self-inflicted injury, his intoxication, his commission of an of-
fense, his knowing failure to use a safety appliance, his knowing failure to
obey a reasonable written or printed rule of the employer which has been
posted in a conspicuous position in the place of work, or his knowing
failure to perform any statutory duty. The burden of proof is on the
defendant.
In each case the misconduct of the employee must be found to have caused the injury.
Compare Hayes Freight Lines v. Martin, 119 Ind. App. 97, 84 N.E.2d 205 (1949),
superseding, 118 Ind. App. 139, 77 N.E.2d 900 (1948). with Gary Railways v. Garling,
120 Ind. App. 36, 88 N.E.2d 571 (1949). See also SMALL, supra note 1, § 11.1 (1950 &
Supp. 1976); 81 AM. JUR. 2d Workmen's Compensation § 237 at 889 (1976).
111. See, e.g., Price v. Reed, 114 Ind. App. 253, 51 N.E.2d 86 (1943); Anti-Mite
Eng'r Co. v. Peerman, 113 Ind. App. 280, 46 N.E.2d 262 (1943); Wood v. Snyder, 83 Ind.
App. 31, 147 N.E. 314 (1925). When the Workmen's Compensation Act was reenacted
in 1929, the legislature separated the element of wilfulness from misdemeanors in Sec-
tion 22-3-2-8 of the Act. Therefore, a misdemeanor need not even be wilful in order to
bar the employee from compensation. It is enough that he commits the misdemeanor,
unwittingly or not. In effect this has brought back into the Act the elements of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. SMALL, supra note 1, § 11.1 (Supp.
1976).
112. See Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hightower, 107 Ind. App. 46, 22 N.E.2d 875
(1939); In re Duncan, 73 Ind. App. 270, 127 N.E. 289 (1920).
113. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Owens, 82 Ind. App. 474, 146 N.E. 427 (1925).
See National Biscuit Co. v. Roth, 83 Ind. App. 21, 146 N.E. 410 (1925); General
American Tank Car Corp. v. Borchardt, 69 Ind. App. 580, 122 N.E. 433 (1919).
114. The Act does not specifically attach the word "wilful" to the commission
of an offense or intoxication. Nevertheless, the term "intoxication" and many types of
1979]
Macke: Judicial Misapplication of the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1979
582 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13
by this section is effectively beyond the scope of conscientious
preventative measures."5
It makes equally as much sense to levy such penalities against
the employer for his wilful conduct. In the employment situation, it
is the employer who has the greatest ability to affect the safety of
working conditions. He is in the best position to control the actions
of the employees and is the only one who can directly prevent his
own wilful conduct. Yet, in effect, present application of the Act
forces the employee to endure his employer's wilful disregard for
safety as if it were a natural element of the employment. If it is
sound policy to deny the employee compensation when he wilfully
disregards his own safety, then it is equally as sound to penalize the
employer who endangers the lives of his employees.
As a result of the Indiana judicial denial of a common law ac-
tion against the employer for his wilful conduct and legislative inclu-
sion of employer defenses, the workmen's compensation system no
longer functions as an equitable balance or compromise. The scales
are clearly tipped in favor of the employer instead of the employee
for whom the Act was originally passed. The present judicial inter-
pretation of the Act is indirectly contrary to legislative intent and
can best be corrected through a legislative and/or judicial effort to
deter the wilful conduct of the employer.
Legislative and Judicial Options for Compensating the Employee In-
jured by His Employer's Wilful Conduct
In order to correct the inequitable imbalance created by judicial
application of the Workmen's Compensation Act to an employer's
wilful conduct, the employee injured by his employer should be
allowed either a common law remedy against the employer or a
percentage increase in his normal compensation benefits."6 Either
remedy will help restrict the employer's freedom to wilfully injure
an employee by increasing the employer's economic losses. A choice
of one or a combination of both must be predicated on furtherance
of the Workmen's Compensation Act as a remedial legislative
measure enacted primarily for the benefit of the employee.
offenses carry with them at least some degree of wilful action -as opposed to those of-
fenses formerly called misdemeanors, which a person can commit unwittingly. See note
111 supra.
115. See Davis, Workmen's Compensation, 33 ATL L.J. 140 (1970); Comment,
Serious and Wilful Misconduct Clauses of California Workmen's Compensation Act, 22
Cal. L. Rev. 432 (1934).
116. See 2A LARSON, supra note 1, § 69 at 13-41.
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The Indiana judiciary's surprising construction of the Act as an
exclusive remedy has counteracted the legislative intent to benefit
the employee. Thus it seems fitting for the judiciary to reevaluate a
judicial construction that dates back to the 1920's. Nevertheless
judicial abstention in Indiana appears to be firmly imbedded. The
courts argue that the legislature alone is empowered to alter
legislative mandates; that it is less restricted than the judiciary and
better equipped to weigh the benefits which either a common law
remedy or a percentage increase in compensation benefits would afford
the employee. The legislature has the power to act more quickly
and to clearly spell out the intent of any changes it deems necessary
to further the humanitarian function of the Act.
To date, this judicial policy of abstention appears to be ac-
cepted by a majority of other jurisdictions as well. At least sixteen
states have enacted statutory provisions which provide the
employee with either a common law remedy, a percentage increase
in compensation, or both for injuries resulting from an employer's
wilful conduct. " 7 In at least one state, New York, the judiciary has
stepped forth to grant the employee a common law remedy. 18
Either the percentage increase or the comnon law remedy can
function in a variety of ways depending upon legislative or judicial
discretion. 9 Under the common law remedy, the injured employee
can accept the normal workmen's compensation benefits, then elect
to sue and subrogate the employer's workmen's compensation in-
surance carrier if the action is successful." ° Alternatively, if the
legislature so chooses, the employee can be forced to gamble by
electing one form of recovery and thus precluding the other.'
117. Serious and wilful misconductk See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022
(Supp. 1978) (common law remedy); CAL. LABOR CODE § 4553 (Supp. 1979) (50% increase
with a maximum penalty of $10,000); MASS. ANN. CODE Ch. 152 § 28 (1958) (100% in-
crease); TEX. CiV. STAT. Art. 8306 § 5 (1967) (common law action if gross or wilful con-
duct results in death). Intentional conduct: See, e.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 656.156 (1963)
(common law remedy for excess amount over award); TEX. CIv. STAT. Art. 8306 § 5
(1967) (common law action); WASH. REV. CODE § 51.24.020 (1978) (common law remedy
for excess amount over award); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1978) (common law remedy for
excess amount over award); Wilful failure to obey safety regulations: See, e.g., OHIO
CONST. art. II, § 35 (15% to 50% increase in award at the discretion of industrial
board); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-7 (1953) (10% increase); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-12 (1977)
(10% increase); S.C. CODE § 72-157 (1962) (10% increase); UTAH CODE ANN. § 102.57
(1973) (15% increase); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 102.57 (1973) (15% increase).
118. See Garcia v. Gusmack Restaurant Corp., - App. Div. -, 150
N.Y.S.2d 232 (1954); Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 271 App. Div. 964, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313 (1946).
119. See 2A LARSON supra note 1, § 70 at 13-56.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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Under the percentage increase remedy, the size of the percent
would of course depend upon legislative discretion. In other jurisdic-
tions the increase ranges from ten to one-hundred percent with
some programs employing a graduated scale of guaranteed compen-
sation for the various forms of wilful conduct. 122 Whatever percen-
tage increase schedule would be adopted, a common law action
should be precluded by a legislative provision for increased benefits
in order to prevent double recovery.
Although the common law remedy is the only means of attain-
ing compensation truly commensurate with the seriousness of the in-
jury, a percentage increase may adequately protect the interests of
the employee by preserving the guarantee of prompt and reasonable
compensation for industrial injuries. A common law action offers no
guarantee of success. Even if the employee is allowed workmen's
compensation when the common law action fails, attorney's fees and
court expenses can amount to a substantial portion of the
employee's compensation benefits. A percentage increase in the nor-
mal compensation benefits removes the expense of a common law ac-
tion and at the same time relieves the courts of timely tort litiga-
tion. The employee is guaranteed compensation for his injury and
the employer retains the protection from unlimited liability.
In addition to preserving the remedial nature of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, the percentage increase remedy can
provide a graduated scale of increases to account for variations in
the degree of risk to the employee and the level of intent among the
several forms of wilful conduct. Most jurisdictions which allow the
employee a common law remedy for an employer's wilful conduct re-
quire a clear showing of the employer's intent to injure the
employee."2 As a result application of the remedy is often restricted
122. See note 117 supra.
123. Since the primary legal justification for allowing the employee a common
law action is the non-accidental nature of wilful injury, most jurisdictions require a
specific intent to injure the employee. Compare Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit Co., 210 Ark.
318, 196 S.W.2d 1 (1946), with Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 217 Ark.
350, 230 S.W.2d 28 (1950). See also Southern Wire & Iron Co. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727,
124 S.E.2d 738 (1962); Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946);
Kenner v. Hanreco, 161 So. 2d 142 (La. App. 1964); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyers,
75 Nev. 212. 337 P.2d 624 (1959); Wilkinson v. Achber, 101 N.H. 7, 131 A.2d 646 (1969).
This effectively limits the scope of deterrent measures to intentional assault and
battery. However, in considering either a common law remedy or a percentage in-
crease in compensation, the Indiana Legislature should examine both wilful misconduct
and an intentional assault and battery in light of the risk each presents to the
employee.
Indiana courts have defined an employee's wilful misconduct as intentional
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to intentional assaults in which the intent is specific and often self-
evident. The percentage increase option can avoid this question of
intent by examining the various forms of wilful conduct in light of
the risk each presents to the employee. If society considers an inten-
tional assault more malicious or more likely to cause injury than
wilful and wanton misconduct or wilful violation of a statutory duty,
then the legislature can introduce separate percentage increase
levels for each. In this manner the percentage increase remedy can
widen the deterrent effects of the Act to include forms of wilful con-
duct which consists of either a general or a specific intent to
disregard the safety of the employee.
Whether it is the function of the legislature to enact an increased
compensation provision or the function of the judiciary to grant the
employee a common law remedy is a matter for the constitutional
philosopher. Although the Indiana judiciary has acted responsibly
with its laissez-faire policy, the courts should recognize that limits
must often be placed on the legislature's freedom not to act. The
judiciary must balance the benefits of its hands-off approach and the
separation of powers against the rights of the employee. In the con-
text of non-action by the legislature for over fifty years, there is lit-
tle question that judicial as well as legislative action is far overdue.
disobedience, conduct quasi-criminal in nature, and deliberate purpose. See e.g.,
Northern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. Pietzvak, 69 Ind. App. 24, 118 N.E. 132 (1917);
American Steel Foundries v. Fisher, 106 Ind. App. 25, 17 N.E.2d 840 (1938). In view of
these characteristics, it is arguable that the "accident" condition can no more be ap-
plied to an employer's wilful misconduct than to an intentional assault and battery.
Neither is unexpected nor without design, and both involve intentional conduct. Any
distinction between general and specific intent does not reflect the fact that in each
case the employer is intentionally and directly disregarding the safety of the
employee.
Common sense suggests that an intentional battery presents a greater risk to
the employee than wilful and wanton misconduct. Yet the characteristics of wilful
misconduct and an intentional disregard for the safety of the employee suggests other-
wise. As intentional battery is most likely aimed at one employee, while the wilful
disregard of a known hazard may threaten many lives indiscriminately. The risk to the
employee created by wilful and wanton misconduct is often undirected and involves a
level of premeditation concerning the degree and likelihood of danger not present in an
impulsive yet intentional battery.
In order to justify a blanket distinction in the Workmen's Compensation Act
between an intentional battery and an intentional disregard for safety, the legislature
and the judiciary should be able to show that the distinction is great enough to
categorize wilful misconduct with negligence. In keeping with the humanitarian prin-
ciples of the Act and the legislative intent to benefit the employee, this will be difficult
indeed.
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CONCLUSION
The Indiana Legislative enacted the Workmen's Compensation
Act as a remedial measure, intending to correct the injustice which
characterized the common law treatment of industrial injuries. It
was designed to provide the employee with reasonable compensation
for his injury and to promote safety within the industrial setting.
Nevertheless, judicial application of the Act has in effect condoned
conduct of the employer which presents the greatest risk of injury
to the employee.
Under present judicial interpretation of the Act, the employer
may wilfully injure his employee without fear of economic loss other
than minimal administrative penalties and a potential increase in in-
surance premiums. Without economic incentive it is naive to expect
the employer to share the concern of the employee for safety in the
workplace. Judicial treatment of the employer's wilful conduct has
been both contrary to the promotion of safety and in derogation of
the same humanitarian aspects of the Act which are often utilized
by the judiciary as justification for its decisions in the context of
non-wilful injuries.
To rectify this inequity, the courts need to grant the employee
the option of pursuing a common law remedy where he is wilfully in-
jured by his employer within the scope of his employment. In fact
the judiciary need not usurp legislative power and function because
judicial interpretation of the Act as an exclusive remedy has
abrogated common law remedies in the wilful injury context. It is
the judiciary's inconsistent construction and misinterpretation which
has tipped the sensitive balance of rights and remedies under the
Act in favor of the employer. Correction of these mistakes may, but
need not, occur solely by legislative mandate.
This is not to say that correction of the inequities which exist
under present application of the Act is solely a problem for the
judiciary. Although it is fully within the power of the courts to allow
the employee a common law remedy against the employer, the prob-
lems can be just as easily and perhaps more efficiently corrected by
the legislature. Unlike the judiciary the legislature can utilize
greater innovation by enacting such provisions as the increased
percentage in compensation for wilfully caused injury.
It matters little which branch of the government restores the
balance and humanitarian nature of the Act. What is important is
that the employer be deterred from freely and wilfully injuring the
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employee without fear of consequence. For either the judiciary or
the legislature to disregard the unique nature of an employer's
wilful conduct is to make a mockery of the workmen's compensation
system.
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